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Abstract
Negotiating parties oftentimes do not reach mutually beneficial agreements. A con-
siderable body of research on negotiation analysis compiled a set of so called common
biases in negotiations that systematically affect the cognition and behavior of nego-
tiators and thereby influence agreements (e.g. Bazerman and Neale 1992; Bazerman
et al. 2000). The present work adds an additional effect, the attachment effect. This
effect biases decision makers in bilateral multi-issue negotiations and influences their
preferences via reference points—negotiators get caught in a kind of negotiation fever.
Keywords: Negotiation Analysis, Consumer Preferences, Behavioral Economics, Ex-
perimental Economics, Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion
Introduction
During the Seminar on Negotiation and Market Engineering held in November 2006 in
Dagstuhl, Germany, several of the participants expressed the following views on preferences
and rationality:
• ‘Game theorists think a lot of things do not matter. Most of the time they are wrong.’
• ‘I prefer auctions in computing systems—there is at least some type of rationality.’
• ‘ZIP, truth telling and so on are simple and elegant strategies which traders use.’
• ‘There is a range of prices for which I just don’t care. I’m in the zone of indifference.’
• ‘Utility maximization is not what I believe in.’
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These statements might not be surprising for someone who thinks about decision-making
in everyday life but they are in contrast to traditional economic modelling of decision making
based on utility maximization. The expression of these viewpoints at the seminar is one
indicator for the fact that there is more to understanding negotiations and markets than
pure, traditional, micro-economic modeling.1
In this vein, the present paper investigates bilateral multi-issue negotiations from differ-
ent perspectives: micro-economics, behavioral economics, and cognitive psychology. In the
terminology of (automated) negotiation (e.g. Jennings et al. 2001), the work deals with the
‘agent decision making model’; in the terminology of market engineering (e.g. Weinhardt and
Gimpel 2006) it is concerned with the ‘agent behavior’ which relates the market structure
to the market outcome.
Recent papers advance the understanding of auction fever, i.e. bidders that seem to get
caught by the dynamics of an auction and outbid their initial upper limit (e.g. Heyman,
Orhun, and Ariely 2004; Ku, Malhotra, and Murnighan 2005). If a bidder had the highest
bid for a long time, for example, she might feel attached to the good and perceive a loss when
being outbid. Correspondingly, the proposed attachment effect in negotiations results in a
kind of negotiation fever: negotiators become attached to specific outcomes on single issues
in the course of a multi-issue negotiation and might perceive a loss when the counterparty
proposes a trade-off that would have been mutually beneficial prior to negotiating.
Theory
The implications of reference points have been studied extensively over the last decades
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991, 1992; Kahneman 1992). The
origin of reference points, on the other hand, is a grossly understudied topic and oftentimes
the status quo is taken as best estimate for a reference point. The present work studies
the emergence and development of reference points in the context of bilateral multi-issue
negotiations. Understanding decision making in negotiations is thereby approached from
a behavioral and an economic view point: The attachment effect model assumes a causal
relationship of
1. offers made by the negotiators,
2. their expectations in the outcome,
3. issue-wise reference points,
4. preferences, and, finally
5. choice.
1The reader should not mistake this as discredit of rational choice models etc.–they are without any
doubt valuable tools in understanding and designing negotiations and markets. However, a wider toolbox is
needed to fully grasp the complexity of negotiations and markets.
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The traditional economic counter piece is a rational choice model that assumes prefer-
ences to be invariable and fix—even if they would base on a reference point, this reference
point would be invariant to any negotiation or market process.
Besides the work by Kahnehman and Tversky which is cited above, the attachment effect
model draws on the ideas of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) and is related to the game-theoretic
equilibrium model by Compte and Jehiel (2006). Previous versions have been published
before (Gimpel 2005a, b, 2006, 2007a). The most comprehensive related publication is
Gimpel (2007b).
Empiricism
Two experiments are conducted to test applicability of the proposed attachment effect model.
In an internet experiment (Gimpel 2007a), students negotiate on attributes of a contract and
in a lab experiment they negotiate on elements of a product bundle. The experiments control
the course of alternating offer multi-issue negotiations and use between-subject comparisons
of preferences expressed ex-post. Data on subjects’ subsequent choices, subjective ratings of
satisfaction and complexity of choices, and response times favor the attachment effect model
over the rational choice model. The effect of single offers on preferences can be quantified
by a maximum-likelihood estimation of the attachment effect model.2
Conclusion
The attachment effect in negotiations is motivated theoretically and the experiments show
clear evidence for a systematic bias: Offers in a negotiation influence the negotiators’ pref-
erences. In a negotiation analysis context (Raiffa 1982, 2003), the results can be used for
prescriptive advice to negotiators: either for debiasing, i.e. for preventing to be affected by
the ‘irrational’ nature of the effect, or to systematically affect the counterparty’s attitude
towards the object of negotiation. As a result, gains from trade can either be created or
destroyed in bilateral interactions. Furthermore, the results can be utilized in engineering
negotiation support systems.
2More detailed results will be published elsewhere.
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